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Abstract 
When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting 
outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to 
other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as “causal superseding.” We propose and test a 
counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 
provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from 
previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent 
on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 
demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violation of non-moral norms. We propose a 
model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency. 
Keywords: Causal reasoning; Counterfactuals; Morality; Superseding 
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1. Introduction 
 In the 1870 case of Carter v. Towne, the court faced an intriguing causal question. The 
defendant sold gunpowder to a child. The child‟s mother and aunt hid the gunpowder, but in a 
location that they knew the child could find and access. The child found the gunpowder and was 
injured. The court judged that the defendant could not be considered to be the cause of the 
child‟s injuries, because of the negligence of the mother and aunt (Hart & Honoré, 1985, pp. 
281-282). 
 This case leaves us with an interesting puzzle about causal reasoning. The question 
before the court was not whether the mother and aunt caused the outcome; it was whether the 
defendant caused the outcome. Yet the court determined that the fact that the actions of the 
mother and aunt were negligent had some effect on the causal relationship between the 
defendant‟s actions and the outcome. This suggests a broader phenomenon of causal reasoning: 
the extent to which one agent is perceived to have caused an outcome may be affected not only 
by his or her own actions, but also by the normative status of other people‟s actions. We refer to 
this as “causal superseding.” 
 It is well-established that judgments of norm violations, such as moral norm violations, 
can affect causal judgments. An agent who acts in a way that is judged to be morally wrong is 
seen as more causal than an agent whose actions confirm with moral norms (e.g., Alicke 1992). 
Recent work has suggested that, rather than being about morality specifically, these effects are 
rooted in the normality of an agent‟s actions, i.e., how much they diverge from prescriptive or 
statistical norms (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; but see Alicke, Rose, 
& Bloom, 2011). However, most of the work to date has focused on how the normality of an 
agent‟s actions affects that agent‟s own causality, not anyone else‟s. The present experiments 
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aim to demonstrate and explore the causal superseding effect suggested by the intriguing case of 
Carter v. Towne. 
 
1.1. Describing Causal Superseding 
Before discussing how the phenomenon of causal superseding may provide helpful 
insight into causal reasoning more generally, it is worth considering how causal superseding is 
related to previous research. In general, there has been relatively little research suggesting that 
causal judgments about one agent are affected by aspects of some other independent agent. That 
the actions of one person can have an influence the causal judgments about another person has 
been demonstrated in the relatively under-discussed research on causal chains where multiple 
agents collectively contribute to the occurrence of some harm (Fincham & Shultz, 1981; 
Fincham & Roberts, 1985; Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012; Lagnado & Channon, 2008; McClure, 
Hilton & Sutton, 2007; Spellman, 1997; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Among other findings, these 
studies report a pattern whereby the first agent in the causal chain was judged to be less of a 
cause of the harm that eventually occurred when the second (more proximal) agent acted 
voluntarily, rather than involuntarily. The explanation offered for this effect was that the 
voluntariness of the proximal agent‟s action „broke‟ the perceived causal chain between the first 
agent and the outcome. This effect differs from the superseding effect suggested by Carter v. 
Towne. In that case, it was not the voluntariness of the aunt and mother‟s actions, but the 
negligence of their actions that prevented the defendant from being a cause of the child‟s 
injuries. Another closely related line of work investigated the role of mutability (i.e. the ease with 
which the cause can be imagined to have been different) and propensity (i.e. the likelihood that 
the effect would occur if the cause was present) in causal judgments (McGill & Tenbrunsel, 
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2000). This study found that one causal factor is seen as weaker when another causal factor is 
more mutable, though only when the mutable cause is also very likely to bring about the 
outcome.  
Here, we specifically focus on the role of norm violations and consider their impact on 
causal judgments across a number of different causal structures. However, even focusing on 
norm violations, we also wish to acknowledge two alternative explanations for the phenomenon 
we investigate, one informed by intuition and the other based on existing and well-supported 
motivational theories. 
First, one might intuitively think that “there is only so much causality to go around,” and 
it is already known that when an agent does something that is morally wrong or otherwise in 
violation of some norm, that agent‟s causality is increased (Alicke 1992; Hitchcock & Knobe, 
2009). Then, if the norm-violation of one agent‟s action increases that agent‟s causality, it 
follows under this intuition that some other factor‟s causality will have to be reduced. Though 
this explanation might at first seem compelling, there is already empirical evidence that causal 
responsibility is not generally a zero-sum judgment (Kominsky, Phillips, Gerstenberg, Lagnado, 
& Knobe, 2014; Lagnado, Gerstenberg & Zultan, 2013; Teigen & Brun, 2011). For example, 
when an outcome was brought about by a collection of causes that were each individually 
necessary for its coming about, then each cause was judged as fully responsible (Lagnado, 
Gerstenberg & Zultan, 2013; Zultan, Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012). Thus, while perhaps 
intuitively attractive, we do not believe this explanation can account for causal superseding. 
 Second, it is already known that people‟s causal judgments can be impacted by 
motivational factors. For example, a series of studies have found that people‟s judgments are 
often distorted by “blame validation” (Alicke, 1992; Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008; 
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Lagnado & Channon, 2008), a motivational bias to assign causality to people who are 
blameworthy, with only minimal regard for their actual causal status. Subsequent work has 
extended this account to include “excuse validation” (Turri, 2013), the motivation to not assign 
causality to individuals whom we do not feel are blameworthy. For example, if a driver is 
speeding because of an accelerator malfunction and gets into a lethal accident, we might be 
disinclined to regard the driver as a cause of the accident because her actions are blameless. This 
basic idea could then be used to explain causal superseding. If one agent does something morally 
wrong and is therefore seen as the one who is to blame for the outcome, people could be 
motivated to exculpate all other agents from blame, and may accordingly reduce the extent to 
which they are seen as causing the outcome. 
 The latter explanations draw on claims that have already received extensive support in 
the existing empirical literature, and we do not mean to call these empirical claims into question 
here. Instead, we simply provide experimental evidence for causal superseding that requires an 
importantly different kind of explanation. Thus the present research goes beyond what has been 
demonstrated in previous work, but is not incompatible with it. 
 
1.2. A counterfactual account of causal superseding 
 We propose an account of the superseding effect based on counterfactual reasoning. 
According to this account, the effects of valence on causal judgments are mediated by 
counterfactual reasoning. This account follows two key claims: First, counterfactual reasoning 
affects causal judgment. Second, moral valence affects counterfactual reasoning. We will explore 
each of these claims in turn. 
 1.2.1. Counterfactual reasoning and causal judgment. 
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 There are many accounts of how counterfactual reasoning interacts with causal judgment 
(e.g., Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado & Tenenbaum, 2014; Lewis, 1973; Petrocelli, Percy, 
Sherman, & Tormala, 2011; but see Mandel, 2003). We focus here on an aspect of the 
relationship between counterfactuals and causation that has been referred to as sensitivity (or 
robustness) of causation (Hitchcock, 2012; Knobe & Szabó, 2013; Lombrozo, 2010; Woodward, 
2006).  
Existing work on counterfactual theories of causation suggests that people regard an 
event as a cause of the outcome when it satisfies two counterfactual conditions, necessity and 
sufficiency (e.g., Pearl, 1999; Woodward, 2006). Take the causal relationship “A caused B”. 
Roughly speaking, this relationship would have the following necessity and sufficiency 
conditions:  
Necessity: If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred. 
Sufficiency: If A had occurred, then B would have occurred. 
Our focus here will be on the second of these conditions – sufficiency – and on the role it plays 
in ordinary causal cognition.  
Woodward (2006) defines a property he calls sensitivity to describe the robustness of a 
causal relationship. A causal condition (necessity or sufficiency) is „sensitive‟ if it would cease 
to hold if the background conditions were slightly different. By contrast, a causal condition is 
„insensitive‟ if it would continue to hold even if the background conditions were substantially 
different. Woodward argues that when the sufficiency condition is highly sensitive, people will 
be reluctant to attribute causation.  
To give a concrete example, consider two sufficiency conditions: “If a lit match had been 
put near gunpowder, the gunpowder would have exploded” and “If you had manufactured 
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fireworks, the child would have been injured.” The first statement is extremely insensitive, or 
robust. There are a large number of things that you can change about the state of the world, but 
the sufficiency statement will still hold true. That is not to say that there are no changes to the 
background conditions that would render the statement false, but they are relatively non-obvious 
or non-salient. In contrast, the second sufficiency statement is more sensitive, because there are a 
large number of immediately salient counterfactual possibilities that would render it false. For 
example, the child may not be able to purchase the fireworks, or use them with supervision, etc.  
This claim about the importance of sufficiency is the first piece of our account of causal 
superseding. In the case of Carter v. Towne, for example, the defendant‟s action was only 
sufficient to bring about the outcome because the mother and aunt happened to act negligently. If 
the mother and aunt had not acted negligently, then even if the defendant had performed exactly 
the same action, the outcome would not have come about. It is for this reason, we claim, that 
people are somewhat disinclined to regard the defendant‟s action as having caused the child‟s 
injuries. Certain facts about the child‟s guardians make the relationship between the defendant 
and the outcome sensitive.  
 1.2.2. Moral valence, norm violations, and counterfactuals. 
 We now need to add a second piece to the puzzle. We noted above that a relationship 
could be considered “sensitive” to the extent that it would not have held if the background 
circumstances had been slightly different. Yet, there will always be some way that the 
background circumstances could have been different such that sufficiency would no longer hold. 
For example, suppose that someone said: “The gunpowder only ignited because it was not 
covered in water. If it were covered in water, the match would not have been sufficient.” Though 
this counterfactual claim is surely correct, there seems to be some important sense in which it is 
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irrelevant – not even worth thinking about. If we want to understand the notion of sensitivity, we 
need to say more about this issue, providing a sense of how to determine whether a given 
counterfactual is relevant or not.  
 Fortunately, there is a substantial body of research on counterfactual reasoning (for 
reviews, see Byrne 2005; Kahneman & Miller, 1986). This research has used a variety of 
techniques to explore the factors that make people regard counterfactuals as more or less 
relevant, and we can turn to this literature for insights into the present question.  
 Although research on counterfactual reasoning has uncovered a variety of notable effects, 
we focus here on two principal findings. First, studies show that likelihood judgments play a role 
in people‟s intuitions about which counterfactuals are relevant and which are not (Byrne, 2005; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). When something unlikely occurs in the actual world, people tend 
to regard as relevant counterfactuals that involve something more likely occurring. Second, 
studies show that moral judgments can influence people‟s intuitions about the relevance of 
counterfactuals (McCloy & Byrne, 2000; N‟gbala & Branscombe, 1995). When an agent 
performs a morally bad action, people tend to regard as relevant the counterfactual in which this 
agent did not perform the morally bad action.  
 To unify these two findings, we can say that people‟s intuitions about the relevance of 
counterfactuals are affected by violations of norms (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009). In some cases, 
an event is seen as unlikely (and hence violates a statistical norm); in other cases, an event is 
seen as morally wrong (and hence violates a prescriptive norm). Even though these two types of 
norm violation are in many ways quite different, they appear to have precisely the same effect on 
counterfactual reasoning. Thus, we can formulate a more general principle, which should apply 
across both types of norm violation. The general principle is: when an event in the actual world 
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is perceived as violating a norm, people tend to regard as relevant counterfactuals in which the 
norm-violating event is replaced by a norm-conforming event.  
 This claim about the impact of norm violation on counterfactual thinking has played a 
role in some existing theoretical work in causal cognition (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; 
Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe & Szabó, 2013), and it forms the second piece of our 
explanation of causal superseding.  
 1.2.3. The counterfactual account of causal superseding 
Putting these ideas together we end up with a counterfactual account of causal 
superseding, which we refer to as the counterfactual sufficiency account. Take the causal claim 
“The defendant selling gunpowder to the child caused the child‟s injuries.” The sufficiency 
condition for this claim reads as follows: “If the defendant had sold gunpowder to the child, then 
the child would have been injured.” Now suppose that sufficiency holds only because the mother 
and aunt negligently hid the gunpowder where the child could find it. Since this act violates a 
norm, people will tend to regard as highly relevant the possibility in which the gunpowder is put 
somewhere that the child could not find it. In that possibility, the defendant‟s action is not 
sufficient, so the negligent actions of the mother and aunt make the defendant‟s sufficiency more 
sensitive. Thus, the defendant is regarded as less of a cause of the outcome, or in other words, is 
superseded. 
By contrast, suppose that the mother and aunt‟s actions did not violate a norm, but 
nonetheless the defendant was sufficient only because of their (normative) actions. Then it might 
still be true that sufficiency would not have held if the mother and aunt had acted differently, but 
the possibility in which they acted differently would be regarded as less relevant, and the 
sufficiency of the defendant‟s action would not be seen as especially sensitive to background 
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circumstances. Instead, it might be felt that the defendant‟s action would have been sufficient for 
bringing about the negative outcome in all of the possibilities that are genuinely worth 
considering.   
Putting this point more abstractly: Suppose that there are two agents, A and B, such that 
the outcome would not have arisen if either of these agents had acted differently. When agent A 
violates a norm, it makes possibilities in which they do not violate the norm very relevant. If the 
sufficiency condition for agent B is not met in those possibilities, the sufficiency of the causal 
link between agent B and the outcome becomes sensitive. Because the sufficiency of that causal 
link is sensitive, agent B is seen as less of a cause of the outcome. This model is represented in 
Fig. 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. The counterfactual model of causal superseding. A‟s norm violation (Real world) leads 
people to consider the counterfactual possibility in which that norm violation did not occur 
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(Counterfactual world). The relationship between B‟s action and the outcome is sensitive to the 
extent that the outcome would not have occurred in the counterfactual world in which A‟s norm 
violation wouldn‟t have taken place. The more sensitive the sufficiency relationship between B‟s 
action and the outcome, the less causally responsible is B‟s action for the outcome – A‟s action 
supersedes B‟s causality.   
 
1.3. Predictions of the counterfactual sufficiency model  
 Our account of causal superseding makes several specific, novel, and testable predictions. 
The first novel prediction is that causal superseding should occur even for outcomes that are in 
no way bad. This goes beyond, but does not contradict, motivational accounts (e.g., Turri, 2013). 
If you are highly motivated to justify the conclusion that an agent is not blameworthy, you can 
do so by making a causal judgment of the form, „This agent did not cause the bad outcome.‟ 
However, that same logic does not apply when the outcome is not bad. In such a case, you might 
still be motivated to justify the conclusion that the agent is not blameworthy, but you could not 
justify that conclusion by making a causal judgment of the form, „This agent did not cause the 
neutral (or good) outcome.‟ Such a judgment would not directly help to show that the agent was 
not blameworthy. Existing work on motivational biases in causal cognition has used precisely 
this logic to show that certain effects are indeed the product of motivation (Alicke, Rose, & 
Bloom, 2011). In contrast, the counterfactual account does not require that the outcome is bad in 
order for superseding to occur. From the standpoint of the counterfactual account, the relevant 
component is the norm violation of the superseding actor (A in Fig. 1), not the valence of the 
outcome. 
 The second prediction is not about when superseding should occur, but rather when it 
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should not. The counterfactual account does not treat the assignment of causality to different 
actors as a zero-sum problem. Our account predicts that superseding should occur only when the 
sufficiency of the superseded actor is threatened. If that is not the case, the wrongness of one 
agent's action should not decrease the other's perceived causality. Consider a situation in which 
an outcome happens if either A or B (or both) act. Here, no matter whether or not A acts, B‟s 
action is sufficient for bringing about the outcome. In this situation the sensitivity of B‟s 
sufficiency for the outcome is independent of A, and therefore we predict that varying the 
normality of A‟s action will not affect the causal judgment of B‟s action.  
 Finally, the third prediction is that superseding should arise for any norm violation, not 
just for violations of moral norms. The key role that moral valence plays in the counterfactual 
account is that of making certain counterfactual possibilities more relevant, and those 
possibilities make the sufficiency of the superseded actor sensitive. Previous work has suggested 
that violations of other norms, such as purely statistical norms, should make counterfactual 
possibilities more relevant in the same way (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), so violations of these 
norms should yield similar superseding effects. 
 We test these three predictions in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 investigate the 
role of outcome valence in causal superseding. Experiment 3 tests the second prediction, 
concerning cases in which superseding should not occur because each actor is independently 
sufficient. Finally, Experiment 4 investigates whether superseding arises not only for violations 
of moral norms but also for violations of statistical norms.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 In the first experiment, we aimed to demonstrate the basic phenomenon of causal 
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superseding. We constructed a scenario with two agents whose actions combine in a conjunctive 
way to bring about a neutral outcome. One agent, whom we will call the “fixed” agent, always 
acted in the same way. Her actions were always morally neutral. The second agent, whom we 
will call the “varied” agent, did something either morally neutral or morally wrong, depending 
on condition. In order to validate our manipulation and verify the neutrality of the outcome, we 
asked participants to rate how good or bad each agent‟s actions were after making causal ratings, 
as well as how good or bad the outcome was. The counterfactual sufficiency account predicts 
that the fixed agent should be seen as less causal when the varied agent‟s actions are morally 
wrong, and that this effect should arise regardless of the valence of the outcome.  
 
2.1. Methods  
 2.1.1. Participants. 
 60 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.20 each for 
completing the survey.  
 2.1.2. Materials and procedure. 
 Two vignettes were created featuring a varied agent (Bill) and a fixed agent (Sue). The 
fixed agent‟s actions remained constant in both vignettes. The moral wrongness of the varied 
agent‟s actions were manipulated between conditions (see Table 1).  
In all conditions, participants were asked to rate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree) scale how much they agreed with each of the following two sentences: “Sue caused them 
to possess the paired set of bookends” (the fixed agent) and “Bill caused them to possess the 
paired set of bookends” (the varied agent). Questions were presented in random order. 
After the causal ratings, participants were asked to rate the valence of each agent‟s 
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actions, as well as the outcome, on a separate page on which they could not see their previous 
ratings or the vignette. Participants were asked: “How good or bad is it that Sue bought the left-
side Bartlett bookend from the antique store,” “How good or bad is it that Bill [bought/stole] the 
right-side Bartlett bookend from his friend” (depending on condition), and “How good or bad is 
it that Bill and Sue have a paired set of Bartlett bookends”. Participants made their ratings on a 
1-7 scale, with “very bad” (1) and “very good” (7) at the endpoints and “neither good nor bad” 
(4) at the midpoint. The three questions were presented in randomized order on the same page. 
 
Table 1: Vignettes for Experiment 1. 
1) Background: Bill's wife, Sue, is out of town for the weekend. She leaves Bill a message that 
says, 'I just saw this marvelous bookend. It's called a Bartlett bookend. So pretty! I'm going to go 
back tomorrow and get one. It will be perfect for the left side of our bookshelf.' 
 
2a) Morally good: Bill goes and visits his 
friend. Bill and his friend talk for a while, and 
when Bill asks if his friend is willing to sell the 
bookend, his friend is happy to sell it. Bill 
makes an offer, but his friend insists on him 
not paying so much. Finally, Bill buys the 
right-side Bartlett bookend from his friend and 
goes home.  
2b) Morally bad: Bill goes and visits his 
friend. Bill and his friend talk for a while, and 
when Bill asks if his friend is willing to sell the 
bookend, his friend tells him it's a precious 
heirloom and he can't part with it. Bill waits 
until later when his friend is in the bathroom, 
and slips the bookend into his bag. Finally, Bill 
leaves his friend's house with the stolen right-
side Bartlett bookend in his bag.  
  
4) Outcome: Then the next day, Sue goes and buys the left-side Bartlett bookend. So, when Sue 
got home, they had the paired set of bookends. 
 
 
2.2. Results and discussion 
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We evaluated the effect of the moral valence manipulation on causal ratings for each 
agent independently, as well as valence ratings for each agent and the outcome. 
 
 2.2.1. Causal ratings. 
 The agreement ratings for causal questions can be found in Fig. 2. Replicating many 
previous studies, agreement ratings for the varied agent (Bill) were higher when he violated a 
norm (M = 5.97, SD = 1.564) than when he did not (M = 4.80, SD = 1.495), t(58) = 2.953, p = 
.005, d = .764.  
 For the fixed agent (Sue), we found a clear causal superseding effect. Agreement ratings 
for Sue were lower when the Bill violated a norm (M = 3.37, SD = 2.059) than when he did not 
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.522), t(58) = -2.210, p = .031, d = .568.  
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Figure 2. Mean agreement ratings with the causal statements about the fixed agent and the varied 
agent as a function of the morality of the varied agent‟s action. Error bars depict SE mean.  
 
 2.2.2. Valence ratings. 
One participant failed to give a valence rating for the fixed agent‟s actions, but their data 
were included in all other analyses. As expected, the varied agent‟s actions were seen as 
significantly worse when he stole the bookend (M = 1.30, SD = .702) than when he bought it (M 
= 5.53, SD = 1.137), t(58) = -17.355, p < .001, d = 4.477. This validates our manipulation as a 
violation of a moral norm. As expected, the fixed agent‟s actions were rated equally good 
whether the varied agent violated a norm (M = 5.10, SD = 1.205) or not (M = 5.23, SD = 1.278), 
t(57) = -.401, p = .69. 
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Unexpectedly, the outcome was seen as significantly worse when the varied agent 
violated a norm (M = 2.93, SD = 1.388) than not (M = 5.70, SD = 1.022), t(58) = -8.791, p < 
.001, d = 2.272. This suggests that participants were re-interpreting the outcome, which did not 
change between conditions, based on the moral valence of the varied agent‟s actions.  
To sum up, we demonstrated the predicted causal superseding effect. When the varied 
agent performed a morally bad action, the fixed agent was seen as less causal. However, because 
the outcome was seen as bad in the conditions where the varied agent performed a morally bad 
action, we did not succeed in testing the hypothesis that the causal superseding effect would arise 
even in cases where the outcome was not itself seen as bad.  
 
3. Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 2, we sought to address an alternative explanation for the causal 
superseding effect observed in Experiment 1. While we intended the outcome in Experiment 1 to 
be neutral in all conditions, participants did not see it that way. Accordingly, a better 
demonstration would be to explicitly manipulate the outcome and show that the superseding 
effect does not interact with the outcome manipulation. In Experiment 2, we thus manipulated 
both the valence of the outcome and the valence of one of the agent‟s actions. 
 
3.1. Methods 
 3.1.1. Participants. 
120 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.20 each for 
completing the survey.  
 3.1.2. Materials and procedure. 
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 We created four vignettes, which were lightly modified versions of the vignettes used by 
Reuter, Kirfel, van Riel, and Barlassina (2014). The vignettes involved two people, Billy and 
Suzy, who work at the same company and have their offices in separate rooms. The key event 
involved Billy and Suzy simultaneously accessing a central computer at 9am. We manipulated 
two elements of this story. First, Billy (the varied agent) was either prohibited from accessing the 
computer at 9am, or allowed to. Second, two people simultaneously accessing the computer 
either had an unexpected positive effect (deleting e-mails containing dangerous viruses) or 
unexpected negative effect (deleting e-mails containing important customer information). This 
led to a 2 (varied agent valence) x 2 (outcome valence) design, which was administered between-
participants. The vignettes can be found in Table 2. 
At the end of the vignette, participants were asked analogous questions to those used in 
Experiment 1. In all conditions, participants were asked to rate on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale how much they agreed with each of the following two sentences: “Suzy 
caused [outcome]” (the fixed agent) and “Billy caused [outcome]” (the varied agent), with the 
outcome adjusted depending on the outcome valence condition. These questions were presented 
in random order. 
After answering these causal agreement questions, participants were asked to rate the 
valence of each agent‟s action and the valence of the outcome on a separate page, using the same 
scales as Experiment 1. These three questions were again presented in random order. 
 
Table 2: Vignettes for Experiment 2 (closely based on vignettes used by Reuter et al., 2014). 
1a) Outcome good: Billy and Suzy work for 
the same company. They work in different 
rooms and both of them sometimes need to 
1b) Outcome bad: Billy and Suzy work for 
the same company. They work in different 
rooms and both of them sometimes need to 
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access the central computer of the company. 
Nobody at the company is aware that if two 
people are logged in to the central computer at 
the same time, some spam e-mails containing 
dangerous viruses are immediately deleted 
from the central computer. 
 
access the central computer of the company. 
Nobody at the company is aware that if two 
people are logged in to the central computer at 
the same time, some spam e-mails containing 
important customer information are 
immediately deleted from the central computer. 
 
2a) Morally neutral: In order to make sure 
that two people are available to answer phone 
calls during designated calling hours, the 
company issued the following official policy: 
Billy and Suzy are both permitted to log in to 
the central computer in the mornings, and 
neither of them are permitted to log in to the 
central computer in the afternoons.  
 
2b) Morally wrong: In order to make sure that 
one person is always available to answer 
incoming phone calls, the company issued the 
following official policy: Suzy is the only one 
permitted to log in to the central computer in 
the mornings, whereas Billy is the only one 
permitted to log in to the central computer in 
the afternoons. Billy is not permitted to log into 
the central computer in the morning. 
 
1a (con’t) Outcome good: Today at 9am, 
Billy and Suzy both log into the central 
computer at the same time. Immediately, some 
work e-mails containing dangerous viruses are 
deleted from the central computer. 
1b (con’t) Outcome bad: Today at 9am, Billy 
and Suzy both log into the central computer at 
the same time. Immediately, some work e-
mails containing important customer 
information are deleted from the central 
computer. 
 
 
3.2. Results 
 3.2.1. Causal ratings 
 The agreement ratings for causal questions can be found in Fig. 3. We conducted two 
separate 2 (varied agent valence) x 2 (outcome valence) ANOVAs for agreement ratings of the 
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varied and fixed agent. For the varied agent, there was a strong effect of varied agent valence, 
with higher agreement ratings when the varied agent violated a norm (M = 5.98, SD = 1.477) 
than not (M = 3.97, SD = 2.077), F(1, 116) = 37.618, p < .001, Kp2 = .096. There was no effect of 
outcome valence, F(1, 116) = .270, p = .6, and no interaction, F(1, 116) = 1.826, p = .179.  
 For the fixed agent, we once again found the causal superseding effect. Agreement 
ratings for the fixed agent were lower when the varied agent violated a norm (M = 2.13, SD = 
1.851) than not (M = 4.12, SD = 2.044), F(1, 116) = 34.064, p < .001, Kp2 = .227. There was also 
a main effect of outcome valence, with slightly lower ratings when the outcome was negative (M 
= 2.66, SD = 2.157) than positive (M = 3.55, SD = 2.129), F(1, 116) = 7.478, p = .007, Kp2 = 
.061. 
 Crucially, the interaction between outcome valence and varied agent valence was not 
significant, though it was marginal, F(1, 116) = 3.158, p = .078. To conclusively determine 
whether outcome valence impacted the causal superseding effect, we turned to participant 
judgments of the valence of the outcome. 
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Figure 3. Mean agreement ratings with the causal statements about the fixed agent (left panel) 
and the varied agent (right panel) as a function of outcome valence and the morality of the varied 
agent‟s action. Error bars depict SE mean.  
 
 3.2.2. Valence ratings. 
 While the critical valence rating is the outcome valence, we also analyzed the valence 
ratings for each agent‟s actions. For the varied agent, there were strong main effects of the varied 
agent‟s action valence (p < .001, Kp2 = .186) and outcome valence (p < .001, Kp2 = .192) and a 
marginal interaction (p = .052). In short, in the norm violation condition, the varied agent‟s 
actions were seen as much more wrong, and the same was true when the outcome was bad. The 
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marginal interaction suggests that the effect of our manipulation of the varied agent‟s action 
might be stronger when the outcome is bad. For ratings of the fixed agent‟s action valence, there 
were again main effects of the varied agent‟s action valence (p < .007, Kp2 = .061) and outcome 
valence (p < .001, Kp2 = .106) but no interaction (p = .798). The fixed agent‟s actions were seen 
as worse when the outcome was bad and when the varied agent‟s actions were neutral.   
 The ratings of outcome valence are particularly relevant. In contrast to Experiment 1, 
there was no effect of the varied agent‟s action on outcome valence, F(1, 116) = .093, p = .761. 
However, there was a very strong effect of our outcome valence manipulation, with very positive 
ratings for the good outcome (M = 6.26, SD = 1.085) and very low ratings for the bad outcome 
(M = 1.77, SD = 1.260), F(1, 116) = 425.203, p < .001, Kp2 = .786.  
 To further verify that judged outcome valence did not account for the causal superseding 
effect, we re-analyzed causal agreement ratings for the fixed agent in a regression using the 
varied agent‟s action as one factor and participants‟ ratings of outcome valence as another, as 
well as the interaction term for the two factors. The overall regression was significant, adjusted 
R2 = .250, F(3, 116) = 14.25, p < .001. Outcome valence ratings were a significant predictor, β = 
.222, p = .006, as was the varied agent‟s action, β = -.466, p  < .001, but importantly the 
interaction term was not significant, β = .090, p = .258. Thus, while judged outcome valence did 
have an independent effect on judgments of the fixed agent‟s causality, it did not alter the causal 
superseding effect. 
  As a final verification that the causal superseding effect exists outside the bounds of 
motivational accounts, we examined ratings of the fixed agent‟s causality, but only those in the 
“good” outcome condition. As the ratings of outcome valence showed, participants regarded this 
outcome as strongly positive. An excuse validation account would not predict a superseding 
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effect in this case, but there very much is. Even when the outcome is good, participants gave 
lower agreement ratings for the fixed agent‟s causality when the varied agent violated a norm (M 
= 2.90, SD = 2.181) than not (M = 4.27, SD = 1.760), t(59) = -2.681, p = .009, d = .691. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the causal superseding effect and demonstrated that it is not 
dependent on the valence of the outcome. While outcome valence did have some impact on the 
causal ratings of the fixed agent, it did not impact the causal superseding effect, that is, the effect 
of the moral status of the varied agent‟s actions on the fixed agent‟s causality. This provides 
strong evidence that causal superseding can be distinguished from excuse validation (Turri, 
2013), and therefore goes beyond the predictions of a motivational account. It is particularly 
striking that the superseding effect emerges even in cases where participants regarded the 
outcome as positive. Intuitively, one might expect that participants would want to give more 
credit for a positive outcome to an agent that acted in accordance with a norm, but in fact we find 
the opposite. 
  
4. Experiment 3 
 As we have distinguished the causal superseding effect from similar motivational effects, 
we now turn to two predictions that are wholly unique to the counterfactual account. First, 
according to the counterfactual account, A will supersede B only if A‟s action makes B‟s 
sufficiency more sensitive. However, in situations where B‟s sufficiency is robust no matter what 
A does there should be no causal superseding. 
 Consider a concrete example: Billy and Suzy work together in the same office. Suzy is 
RUNNING HEAD: CAUSAL SUPERSEDING 
 
25 
supposed to come in at 9 AM, whereas Billy has specifically been told not to come in at that 
time. The office has a motion detector, and the motion detector will be set off if it detects two or 
more people entering the room at the same time. Both Suzy and Billy arrive at 9am the next day, 
and the motion detector goes off. This case has the same basic structure as the ones examined in 
Experiments 1 and 2, and the counterfactual account predicts that it should produce the same 
causal superseding effect. Since Billy‟s action violates a norm, the possibility in which he 
doesn‟t act will be seen as highly relevant. Then, since Suzy‟s act would not be sufficient for the 
outcome in that possibility, she will be seen as less causal.  
 But now consider a slightly modified version of the case. What if, instead, the motion 
detector will be set off if it detects one or more people entering the room? In this case, either 
Suzy or Billy would have been sufficient to bring about the outcome. Since Billy‟s action is bad, 
the possibility in which he doesn‟t act is seen as highly relevant. However, even in that 
possibility, Suzy‟s action would still have been sufficient for bringing about the outcome. Thus, 
we predict that Suzy‟s causality should be unaffected by the moral valence of Billy‟s actions 
when each individual action is sufficient for bringing about the outcome. 
The difference between these two scenarios comes down to a difference in their causal 
structures. In the first case, and in all of the vignettes used in Experiments 1 and 2, the scenario is 
conjunctive, as the outcome requires the actions of both one agent AND the other. In the second 
case, where we do not predict causal superseding, the scenario is disjunctive, that is, the outcome 
can be generated by one agent OR the other.  
More abstractly, if the varied agent‟s actions are morally wrong, the possibility that the 
varied agent does not act becomes more relevant. However, if in that possibility the fixed agent 
can still bring about the outcome on her own, then her sufficiency is unaffected, and according to 
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the counterfactual sufficiency account, she should not be superseded.  
 We tested this prediction directly in Experiment 3 by manipulating the event structure 
such that the scenario was either disjunctive or conjunctive. We predicted a causal superseding 
effect in the conjunctive scenario but not in the disjunctive scenario. 
 
4.1. Methods 
4.1.1. Participants. 
 240 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.20 each for 
completing a brief survey. 
4.1.2. Materials and procedure. 
 We created new vignettes that we manipulated along two dimensions. First, as in 
previous experiments, we manipulated the moral valence of the varied agent‟s actions, such that 
they were either neutral or wrong. Second, we manipulated the structure of the event such that 
both the fixed and varied agent‟s actions were required to bring about the outcome (conjunctive), 
or either agent alone could bring about the outcome (disjunctive). See Table 3 for full vignettes. 
 
Table 3: Vignettes for Experiment 3. 
1a) Morally good: Suzy and Billy are working 
on a project that is very important for our 
nation‟s security. The boss tells them both: „Be 
sure that you are here at exactly 9am. It is 
absolutely essential that you arrive at that 
time.‟ 
1b) Morally bad: Suzy and Billy are working 
on a project that is very important for our 
nation‟s security. The boss tells Suzy: „Be sure 
that you are here at exactly 9am. It is 
absolutely essential that you arrive at that 
time.‟ Then he tells Billy: „Be sure that you do 
not come in at all tomorrow morning. It is 
absolutely essential that you not appear at that 
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time.‟ 
 
2) Event: Both Billy and Suzy arrive at 9am. 
 
3a) Conjunctive: As it happens, there was a 
motion detector installed in the room where 
they arrived. The motion detector was set up to 
be triggered if more than one person appeared 
in the room at the same time. So the motion 
detector went off. 
3b) Disjunctive: As it happens, there was a 
motion detector installed in the room where 
they arrived. The motion detector was set up to 
be triggered if at least one person appeared in 
the room. So the motion detector went off. 
 
 
In all conditions, participants were asked how much they agreed with the statement “Suzy 
caused the motion detector to go off”, using the same 1-7 scale as in previous experiments. (We 
did not ask about the varied agent‟s causality in this experiment.) Following this, they were 
asked to complete a comprehension check: “Who was supposed to show up at 9am?” They could 
choose “Billy”, “Suzy”, or “Both of them.” 
 
4.2. Results 
We excluded nine participants who failed the comprehension check, leaving 234 for 
analysis. Fig. 4a shows participants‟ mean agreement ratings as a function of the moral valence 
of the varied agent‟s action and the causal structure of the situation.  
 A 2 (moral valence) x 2 (causal structure) ANOVA revealed main effects of moral 
valence, F(1, 230) = 14.666, p < .001, Kp2 = .06, and causal structure, F(1, 230) = 31.768, p < 
.001, Kp2 = .121, as well as a significant interaction between the two, F(1, 230) =  11.577, p = 
.001, Kp2 = .048. Further analyses looked at the conjunctive and disjunctive structures separately. 
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As predicted, there was a significant superseding effect in the conjunctive condition, with lower 
agreement ratings for the fixed agent when the varied agent‟s actions were morally wrong (M = 
2.46, SD = 1.87) than when they were not (M = 4.11, SD = 1.803), t(112) = 4.786, p < .001, d = 
.898. However, in the disjunctive condition, there was no such superseding effect: Agreement 
ratings for the fixed agent did not differ between situations in which the varied agent‟s actions 
were immoral (M = 4.53, SD = 1.76) or neutral (M = 4.62, SD = 1.54), t(118) = .324, p = .7. 
 These results support the predictions of the counterfactual sufficiency account of causal 
superseding: Causal superseding occurs only when the actions of one agent can affect the 
sufficiency of the other agent‟s action.  
 
 
Figure 4a and 4b: Mean agreement ratings with the causal statements about the fixed agent as a 
function of causal structure and action valence (Experiment 3, left side) or event probability 
(Experiment 4, right side). Error bars depict SE mean. 
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5. Experiment 4 
 In addition to replicating the interaction with causal structure found in Experiment 3, 
Experiment 4 tested another prediction of the counterfactual sufficiency account. As discussed in 
the introduction, moral valence is just one example of a violation of norms. Any violation of 
norms, even non-moral ones, by the varied agent should make the counterfactual possibility that 
those actions did not occur more relevant. Thus, according to the counterfactual sufficiency 
account, we should also see causal superseding even when an event is seen as violating a purely 
statistical norm. Experiment 4 tested this prediction. 
 
5.1. Methods 
5.1.1. Participants. 
120 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and paid $0.20 for their 
participation. 
5.1.2. Materials and procedure. 
 Experiment 4 followed the structure of Experiment 3 very closely, but differed in content. 
Instead of fixed and varied agents we used fixed and varied events that resulted from a single 
agent‟s actions. The fixed event was a coin-flip, while the varied event was rolling two six-sided 
dice. We manipulated the likelihood of the varied event by changing the minimum value that the 
dice needed to achieve in order for the outcome to be successful – higher than 2 (very likely) or 
higher than 11 (very unlikely). We also manipulated the event structure, such that both the coin 
flip and the die roll were necessary for Alex to win (conjunctive), or either one alone was 
sufficient (disjunctive). The vignettes for Experiment 4 are displayed in Table 4. 
Participants were then asked how much they agreed with the statement, “Alex won 
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because of the coin flip”, on a 1-7 scale. They were additionally asked two comprehension check 
questions: “What did Alex need to roll higher than in order to win?” and “Which was more 
likely, that he would get heads on the coin flip or roll high enough on the dice roll?” 
 
Table 4: Vignettes for Experiment 4. 
1) Background: Alex is playing a board game. Every turn in the game, you simultaneously roll 
two six-sided dice and flip a coin. Alex will either win or lose the game on his next turn. 
  
2a) Likely/Conjunctive: Alex will only win 
the game if the total of his dice roll is greater 
than 2 AND the coin comes up heads. It is very 
likely that he will roll higher than 2, and the 
coin has equal odds of coming up heads or 
tails. 
 
Alex flips the coin and rolls his dice at exactly 
the same time. The coin comes up heads, and 
he rolls a 12, so just as expected, he rolled 
greater than 2. Alex wins the game. 
2b) Unlikely/Conjunctive: Alex will only win 
the game if the total of his dice roll is greater 
than 11 AND the coin comes up heads. It is 
very unlikely that he will roll higher than 11, 
but the coin has equal odds of coming up heads 
or tails. 
 
Alex flips the coin and rolls his dice at exactly 
the same time. The coin comes up heads, and 
he rolls a 12, so amazingly, he rolled greater 
than 11. Alex wins the game. 
 
2c) Likely/Disjunctive: Alex will only win the 
game if the total of his dice roll is greater than 
2 OR the coin comes up heads. It is very likely 
that he will roll higher than 2, and the coin has 
equal odds of coming up heads or tails. 
 
Alex rolls his dice and flips the coin at exactly 
the same time. The coin comes up heads, and 
he rolls a 12, so just as expected, he rolled 
2d) Unlikely/Disjunctive: Alex will only win 
the game if the total of his dice roll is greater 
than 11 OR the coin comes up heads. It is very 
unlikely that he will roll higher than 11, but the 
coin has equal odds of coming up heads or 
tails. 
 
Alex flips the coin and rolls his dice at exactly 
the same time. The coin comes up heads, and 
RUNNING HEAD: CAUSAL SUPERSEDING 
 
31 
greater than 2. Alex wins the game. he rolls a 12, so amazingly, he rolled greater 
than 11. Alex wins the game. 
 
5.2. Results 
 13 participants were excluded for having failed to correctly answer the comprehension 
questions leaving 107 for analysis. The results can be found in Figure 4b. 
We conducted a 2 (likelihood) x 2 (causal structure) ANOVA. There was a main effect of 
likelihood, F(1, 106) = 11.294, p = .001, Kp2 = .096, no main effect of causal structure, F(1, 106) 
= 1.100, p = .297, but critically there was once again an interaction between the two, F(1, 106) = 
15.786, p < .001, Kp2 = .130. As in Experiment 3, further analyses revealed that there was a 
superseding effect only in the conjunctive scenario. In the conjunctive condition, the coin flip 
was seen as less causal when the dice roll was unlikely (M = 2.88, SD = 1.31) than when it was 
likely (M = 5.19, SD = 1.40), t(56) = 6.415, p < .001, d = 1.704. However, in the disjunctive 
condition, the coin flip was equally causal when the dice roll was unlikely (M = 4.46, SD = 1.79) 
and likely (M = 4.27, SD = 2.01), t(50) = -.364, p = .7.  
 
6. General Discussion 
Four experiments demonstrated the phenomenon of causal superseding and found 
supporting evidence for the predictions of a counterfactual sufficiency account. Experiments 1 
and 2 demonstrated that the effect operates outside the bounds of excuse validation and other 
motivational accounts. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the effect holds in conjunctive causal 
structures but not disjunctive causal structures, as predicted by a counterfactual sufficiency 
account. Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that causal superseding is not specific to violations 
of moral norms, but shows up for violations of statistical norms as well. 
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 The causal superseding effect demonstrated across these four studies is both an exciting 
discovery and something that has been in legal records for over a century (Hart & Honore, 1985). 
The case of Carter v. Towne and other legal decisions show that this effect emerges in a real-
world context, and can have large impact on the lives of those involved in these court decisions. 
At the same time we have demonstrated something very surprising in the context of previous 
work on causal reasoning: Causal judgments of an agent‟s role in neutral or even positive 
outcomes (such as deleting computer viruses, or winning a board game) can be strongly affected 
not only by their own actions, but by the actions of other agents, provided the event has a 
particular causal structure.  
At this point it is important to acknowledge two relatively recent findings that provide 
evidence for effects that are related to, but distinct from, causal superseding. McGill & 
Tenbrunsel (2000) examined causal judgments in cases in which two causal factors combined in 
a conjunctive way to bring about an outcome. Their experiments varied the ease with which one 
of the causal factors could be imagined to have been different (mutability) and the likelihood that 
this factor will bring about the outcome (propensity). The results showed that varying the 
mutability and propensity of one causal factor influenced participants‟ causal ratings judgments 
about the other factor. More specifically, McGill & Tenbrunsel (2000) found an interaction 
between mutability and propensity, such that propensity had the opposite effect depending on 
whether the cause was more or less mutable. When the alternative causal factor had a high 
propensity to bring about the effect, causal judgments to the target factor decreased when the 
alternative factor‟s mutability was high compared to low. This pattern of results is consistent 
with the predictions of the counterfactual sufficiency model. In contrast, when the alternative 
causal factors‟ propensity was low, the target factor was seen as more causal when the alternative 
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factor‟s mutability was high rather than low. In our scenarios, we did not manipulate mutability 
and propensity at the same time. More work is needed to explore the ways in which variations in 
mutability, propensity, and causal structure influence causal judgments.  
 A second related study made a valuable contribution to the current work already, in 
providing a framework for the vignettes in Experiment 2 (Reuter et al., 2014). In the original 
study, they examined the role of norm violations and temporal order in causal selection. 
Importantly, rather than using a rating scale, Reuter et al. (2014) had their participants make a 
forced choice between the two agents in the scenario. They found that the agent who violated a 
norm was more likely to be selected as the cause, and indeed this is compatible with the causal 
superseding effect, but it does not distinguish whether the varied actor was seen as more causal 
or whether the fixed actor was seen as less causal. Temporal order also played a significant role 
in their findings, but was not a focus of the current research. However, the role of temporal 
order, and contingency, are critical avenues of future research.  
 In the remainder of our discussion we will delve further into our counterfactual account 
and present a number of specific and testable additional predictions as avenues for possible 
future research. Regardless of whether or not they turn out to be precisely correct, the 
phenomenon of causal superseding is worthy of study, and testing possible explanations should 
grant novel insight into causal and counterfactual reasoning.  
 
6.1. Normality and counterfactuals 
 One key element of our account is the notion that moral judgments impact causal 
cognition by playing a role in people‟s overall judgments of normality (Hitchcock & Knobe, 
2009). Hence, we predicted, and found, that non-moral norm violations have the same effect as 
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moral violations. Our account merely requires a norm violation that leads people to focus on 
particular counterfactual possibilities, but makes no stipulations about the nature of the norm 
being violated. Thus, we expected that any norm violation should yield a causal superseding 
effect.  
The strongest support for this can be found in comparing the results of Experiments 3 and 
4. Experiment 3 used a moral norm violation whereas Experiment 4 used a statistical norm 
violation. The two experiments were otherwise extremely similar, and the results, while differing 
slightly in the strength of the effect, show the same clear pattern. Rather than just a simple main 
effect, both experiments produced the same interaction between causal structure and norm 
violation. Someone who wished to argue that we must treat these norm violations differently, or 
that we found two different superseding effects, would face a steep challenge.  
It is worth noting that the counterfactual possibilities people consider based on these 
norm violations is partially reliant on the background knowledge they bring to the scenario. In 
using a variety of scenarios designed to be close to the real world, we relied on participants 
sharing certain assumptions about the real world such that they would consider the right 
counterfactual possibilities, and consider our intended norm violations to actually be norm 
violations. For example, one crucial assumption of the Bartlett Bookends scenario is the 
assumption that, had Bill not stolen the bookend from his friend, he would have had no other 
means of acquiring a right-side Bartlett bookend. We emphasize this to participants by stating 
that his friend could not bear to part with it, and failing to mention a right-side Bartlett bookend 
anywhere else in the scenario, but ultimately it is participants‟ own knowledge about how the 
world works that they are bringing to the experiment that determines which counterfactual 
possibilities they consider. 
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However, in the context of our explanation, norm violations are merely one way in which 
particular counterfactual possibilities are highlighted. In fact, our explanation does not require 
norm violations at all. The causal superseding effect merely requires a salient counterfactual 
possibility in which the sufficiency of one cause is undermined. Any other means of making such 
a possibility salient should generate the superseding effect as well. For example, one might be 
able to generate a superseding effect by explicitly instructing participants to consider a specific 
counterfactual possibility. Or one could make use of any of the other factors that have been 
studied in regard to counterfactual thinking such as the controllability of the action or outcome 
(c.f., Girotto, Legrenzi & Rizzo, 1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000; McGill & Tenbrunsel, 2000).  
 
6.2. Sufficiency and sensitivity 
Our explanation of the causal superseding effect rests on two key assumptions. First, 
people‟s causal judgments are influenced by the degree to which they regard a factor as 
sufficient and insensitive. In other words, when people are trying to determine whether A caused 
B, their judgments are influenced in part by the degree to which they think A would have been 
sufficient for B in various counterfactual possibilities. Second, people do not treat all 
counterfactual possibilities equally. They regard some counterfactual possibilities as more 
relevant than others. Thus far, we have been relying on a purely computational-level 
understanding of these two assumptions. We now present the broad outlines of an approach to 
actually implementing them on a more algorithmic level.  
Our approach takes advantage of an insight that has proven helpful in numerous other 
areas of cognitive science (e.g., Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013). Specifically, we 
propose that people might solve this problem by sampling. In other words, it is not that people 
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consider every single counterfactual possibility and then weight each possibility by its degree of 
normality. Rather, people simply sample a small number of counterfactual possibilities, with the 
probability of any given counterfactual possibility ending up in the sample being proportional to 
its degree of normality.  
To present this approach in more formal terms, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets (Pearl, 
2000; Halpern & Pearl, 2005), in which causal relationships are defined in terms of functional 
relationships between variables representing potential causes and effects. Causal Bayes Nets take 
the form of networks of variables and causal relationships between them that represent the 
probability distribution for one set of variables given that one observes or sets values for another 
set of variables. Therefore they can support inferences about the state of causal variables from 
observed effects, and are useful for predicting the outcomes of interventions on specific 
variables. Causal Bayes Nets can also be used to represent counterfactual statements about what 
would have happened if the state of a particular variable had been different from what it actually 
was. The counterfactual aspects of Causal Bayes Nets will be the focus of our discussion here. 
With Causal Bayes Net representations of counterfactual possibilities in the background, 
let us now consider Pearl‟s (1999) definition of counterfactual sufficiency. To assess whether or 
not a candidate cause variable was sufficient for bringing about the effect, we must first 
condition on what actually happened. Now, we imagine a situation in which the candidate causal 
event as well as the effect event did not occur. In this possibility in which the effect event did not 
occur, we then assess whether intervening on the candidate cause in order to make it true would 
reestablish the effect we have actually observed. If the effect would still have occurred following 
that intervention, then the cause was sufficient for bringing it about; otherwise, it was not.  
Intuitively, we can think of this operation in the following way: in order to assess the 
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counterfactual sufficiency of a causal event, we undo the specific events leading up to the causal 
event of interest, effectively “rewinding” the world to the point before the event occurs, though 
leaving factors not on the direct pathway from (proposed) cause to effect as they are. In that 
minimally different situation, we then imagine that the causal event were in fact true and press 
the „play button‟ in the mental simulation and see whether or not the effect would still have 
occurred.  
Recently, Lucas and Kemp (2012) have extended Pearl‟s definition in a way that 
introduces the notion of sampling. Rather than supposing that people use a veridical, “rewound” 
copy of the actual world, they suggest that people resample, yielding a noisy copy of the actual 
world. Thus, people do not simply get a purely deterministic answer as to whether the outcome 
would have still occurred, but an answer that draws on a probabilistic sampling process. Yet this 
hypothesis immediately leaves us with a further question, namely, how to model the process 
whereby people sample possibilities.  
It is here that the notion of norms become relevant to our account. As we saw above, 
people are more inclined to consider possibilities that unfold in accordance with norms (both 
statistical and moral) than to consider possibilities that violate such norms. Thus, if a variable 
realizes a norm-violating value in the actual world (Bill steals a bookend), its value in the 
simulation – if resampled – is more likely to be in accordance with the norm (Bill does not steal 
the bookend).  
Putting these ideas together, we get at least the broad outlines of how causal superseding 
can be explained through the influence of normality on a model of counterfactual sufficiency. 
The basic idea is that people are implicitly running mental simulations over their causal 
representation of the world. To determine whether A is sufficient for B, they run a series of 
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simulations of a certain type in which they set A to occur and check to see whether B occurs. 
However, they do not simply run simulations that differ from the actual world in arbitrary ways. 
Instead, they show a bias to simulate possibilities in which events accord with norms rather than 
violate norms. For this reason, if A only brings about B in conjunction with some norm-violating 
event, A will be unlikely to be seen as sufficient for B. This is the phenomenon of causal 
superseding.  
 
6.3. Integrating sufficiency into a larger theory 
In the previous section, we have presented a theory of counterfactual sufficiency that 
accounts well for the results of the experiments reported in this paper. While we do believe that 
causal judgments are closely linked to counterfactual simulations over causal representations (cf. 
Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Gerstenberg, in press; Chater & Oaksford, 2013; Gerstenberg et al., 
2014), we have also made it clear that the proposed account of the superseding effect is not to be 
understood as a complete theory of causal attribution. Indeed, there are several empirical 
phenomena that our counterfactual sufficiency account would not apply to.  
First, while our account of the superseding effect focuses on counterfactual sufficiency, 
several studies have shown that people‟s causal judgments are influenced by counterfactual 
necessity as well. For example, previous work has shown that people‟s causal and responsibility 
attributions are reduced in situations in which the outcome was causally overdetermined by 
multiple individually sufficient causes (Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2010, 2012; Lagnado et al., 
2013; Zultan et al., 2012). When two players in a team succeeded in their individual task, each 
player received greater responsibility for the team‟s win in a situation in which both 
contributions were necessary compared to a situation in which the success of either player in the 
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team would have been sufficient. This effect cannot be explained in terms of counterfactual 
sufficiency. The sensitivity of whether an agent‟s action is sufficient for the outcome is increased 
in a conjunctive causal structure but is unaffected by the (expected) actions of others in a 
disjunctive causal structure.  
Building on formal structural models of causal responsibility (Chockler & Halpern, 2004; 
Halpern & Pearl, 2005), Lagnado et al. (2013) developed a criticality-pivotality model which 
predicts that people‟s responsibility attributions to individual group members are influenced both 
by (a) how critical each individual‟s contribution is perceived for the group‟s positive outcome 
ex ante and by (b) how close each individual‟s contribution was to being pivotal ex post (see 
Lagnado and Gerstenberg, to appear, for evidence that similar considerations also influence 
people‟s judgments in non-agentive contexts). Note that the pattern of causal judgments found in 
the current paper would not be predicted by the criticality-pivotality model. The criticality-
pivotality model predicts that the extent to which a person is judged to be causally responsible 
for an outcome decreases the more distant the actual situation was from a situation in which the 
person‟s action would have made a difference to the outcome. However, the experiments 
reported here show that the causal superseding effect occurs in conjunctive situations (where 
each person‟s contribution was pivotal) but not in disjunctive situations (where the outcome was 
overdetermined and hence neither contribution pivotal). Future research will need to tease apart 
the factors that determine in what situations causal judgments are more strongly influenced by 
counterfactual necessity versus sufficiency.  
Second, counterfactual sufficiency does not explain the effect whereby abnormal actions 
are judged more causal than normal actions. It does predict that the normality of A‟s actions 
influences the causal judgment about another B‟s actions when their actions combine 
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conjunctively – that is the basic superseding effect. However, in line with previous findings 
(Alicke, 1992; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009), our results show that A is judged more causal when 
her action was norm-violating than when it conformed to the norm. Thus, as we noted in the 
introduction, judgments of sufficiency appear to be one part of the story but do not by any means 
constitute the entirety of causal cognition. 
One way to incorporate previous findings into our framework would be to assume that 
the normality of A's action influences whether people consider a counterfactual possibility in 
which A behaves differently. When A‟s action was abnormal, they might consider whether A‟s 
action would still have been sufficient for bringing about the outcome if it had been normal 
instead (cf. Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014). However, when A‟s action 
was normal, counterfactual possibilities involving an alternative abnormal action do not come to 
mind so naturally. Thus, A‟s action is perceived to have made more of a difference to the 
outcome when it was abnormal than when it was normal (Petrocelli et al., 2011).  
 
6.4. Broader implications for causal cognition 
 One point that has not yet been discussed is how we treat the role of moral and other 
norm violations in causal cognition. Previous work has been divided on whether we should treat 
moral considerations as (a) playing a role in the operation of people‟s causal cognition itself or 
(b) introducing some external bias or pragmatic factor that is skewing the results of what is in 
fact a purely non-moral causal cognition system (for a review, see Knobe, 2010). We present 
further evidence that moral violations are included in our causal reasoning, in part by 
demonstrating an effect that, as noted above, does not hinge on morality specifically. The causal 
superseding effect has two key features which make it difficult to explain as a bias or pragmatic 
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effect that is not part of causal cognition: First, we find it with non-moral norm violations, 
something which these morality-as-external-bias accounts do not suggest. The probabilistic norm 
violation in Experiment 4 provides evidence that norm violations in general, including moral 
violations, have an impact on our causal judgments. Second, the effect of both moral and 
statistical norm violations is dependent on the causal structure of the event. If morality 
functioned as an outside bias that skewed our causal judgment, it would be somewhat surprising 
if that bias operated on only some causal structures and not others. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest 
that these norm violations are considered along with causal structure in making causal 
judgments. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 This paper presents evidence for the surprising phenomenon of causal superseding, and 
offered a preliminary explanation that opens up a number of avenues for further exploration. 
Beyond the effect of causal superseding itself, this paper brings to light a number of interesting 
questions about how the actions of one agent can impact causal judgments about other agents. 
These effects are worth investigating both for the real-world impact these judgments can have in 
legal settings and for the insights they can afford us into the operations of human causal 
cognition. 
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Causal Superseding Highlights 
 
When one agent violates a norm, other agents are rated as less of a cause. 
This phenomenon, causal superseding, is not explained by existing accounts. 
We provide evidence for a counterfactual sufficiency account of causal superseding. 
Causal superseding occurs for positive outcomes and negative outcomes. 
Causal superseding only occurs when both agents are required for the outcome. 
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